


IN SERVICE OF THE NATION:

CANADA'S CITIZEN SOLDIERS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

A REPORT TO THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
THE HONOURABLE ART EGGLETON



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
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THE HONOURABLE ART EGGLETON





May 19, 2000

The Honourable Art Eggleton
Minister of National Defence
National Defence Headquarters
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2

Dear Minister:

Last fall, you asked me to provide you with advice on how to resolve the impasse in the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) process. With the concurrence of my colleagues D. Bevis Dewar and Dr. David Bercuson, an interim report was submitted to you on March 30, 2000.

As you are aware, we have consulted widely across Canada with and have received submissions from Regular and Reserve serving officers, warrant officers and other ranks, as well as the broader reserve community. We have given careful consideration to everything we heard and read and have assessed the implications of the options available.

Our final report and recommendations, entitled *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, is respectfully submitted for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

John A. Fraser
Chairman

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IN SERVICE OF THE NATION: **Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century**

Origins of the Crisis

The future of Canada's reserve forces, particularly the Army Reserves, is in crisis. Army Reserve strength is at less than 60% of the level directed by government, the reserves community and National Defence Headquarters have become alienated on many fundamental matters affecting the Reserves and there is nation-wide concern that the Army Reserves, or Militia, has been neglected to the point where its very survival as a national institution is in serious jeopardy. The alienation that characterizes the current impasse in reserve restructuring revolves around several questions about the Reserve forces. These themes are well known and, for that matter, have risen repeatedly in various shapes since the end of the Second World War:

- The *raison d'être* of the Reserves
- Roles and operational tasks which should be derived therefrom
- The 'true' financial cost of the Reserves and the planning, allocation and accountability processes for budgets
- How, and by whom, the Reserves should be commanded
- The relationship of the Reserves and Regular forces
- Reserve personnel policies, and how they are administered

During the Cold War and after, several studies focused on Canada's Army Reserve or Militia in order to wrestle these matters to the ground. At the same time, the Militia has undertaken a wide variety of tasks exhibiting a remarkable ability to meet successive challenges. Some consideration of this context should inform decisions made now on the future of Canada's Army Reserves.

At the end of the Second World War, Canada's overall strategic concept was based on mobilization. The three services maintained cadre forces to allow for the rapid expansion of the Militia, Naval Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force in the event of war. Ships and aircraft were mothballed, while the resources for several divisions were stored at various sites throughout the country. The mobilization plan called for the activation of an army roughly the same size and shape as the 1st Canadian Army deployed in northwest Europe in 1944-45. Several factors prevented the Militia from maintaining the numbers necessary for such mobilization in peacetime, largely driven by the high employment rates in the post-war boom years.

The Cold War developed to the point where Canadian forces were required to respond to alliance activities. Yet the single regular brigade group in Canada, which by this time had the dual role of handling continental and homeland defence, could not be deployed since it was already over committed. Therefore, when the Government deemed it necessary to deploy a brigade group to fight in Korea, it had no men to send. A two brigade-group force was raised off the streets using the legal term 'Special Force' since this was supposed to be a limited engagement for this particular operation. One brigade group acted as a manpower pool while the

other, 25 Brigade, deployed to Korea. 25 Brigade was a mixture of regular Army personnel, demobilized Second World War veterans, Militia personnel, and men who had been too young to fight in that war. Militia personnel had to take leave from their units and sign up as part of the Special Force. No formed Militia units or sub units were deployed as part of 25 Brigade.¹ As for the naval and air forces committed to Korea, the three-destroyer naval increment consisted of regular Navy ships, though they may have had some Naval reserve individual augmentation. The RCAF transport squadrons may also have had individual augmentation.

During the early stages of the Korean conflict, which lasted from 1950-1953, the Government deemed it necessary to deploy forces to Western Europe to meet its NATO commitment. After much soul searching, military and government officials realized that Canada was in a new type of war that was dissimilar to the Second World War. The Cold War called for maintaining forces in being to deter enemy action and then hold ground until forces could be mobilized. Since the Canada-based brigade group was dual-rolled as a training and continental defence force and 25 Brigade was fighting Chinese Communists in Korea, forces would have to come from some other source. The problems with raising, training and deploying 25 Brigade were manifest, so Army HQ decided to create a total force brigade group for the NATO commitment. The line units of 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group consisted of three composite Militia infantry battalions (drawn from 15 Militia infantry regiments), a composite Militia artillery regiment (composed of personnel from six Militia regiments), a composite Militia engineer field squadron (two Militia field squadrons and a Militia engineer regiment), and a composite Militia Field ambulance (two Militia units). The regular Army provided a tank squadron which was actually a composite Militia-regular force sub-unit.²

The Army was completely re-organized in 1954: all four brigade groups reverted to regular force formations and the Militia and Special Force personnel were allowed to sign up. As for the RCAF, the new emphasis on air defence in North America and the deployment of 1 Air Division to NATO in Europe demanded expansion of the Auxiliary Air Force. Continental defence requirements boosted funding to two Auxiliary B-25 light attack bomber squadrons which operated in conjunction with the Army's Mobile Striking Force for joint Arctic operations. Two Auxiliary F-86 Sabre jet fighter squadrons were deployed in the late 1950s as part of Canada's front line air defence forces. Auxiliary RCAF pilots periodically served with 1 Air Division in Europe.³ Reserve force employment for the 1950s should be characterized as extremely active in the front lines of the Cold War with a high level of interaction with the regular forces.

Reserve restructure was never far from the minds of Army leadership, however. In 1954, Major-General Howard Kennedy issued his *Report of the Board of Officers on the Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force)*. The report assigned to the Militia the role of

¹ Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) Ch. 3. See also David J. Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999)

² Sean M. Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997) Ch.1.

³ Sean M. Maloney, "The Mobile Striking Force and Continental Defence, 1948-1955," *Canadian Military History* Vol. 2 No. 2 pp. 75-88; Larry Milberry, *The Canadair Sabre* (Toronto: CANAV Books, 1986) p. 368.

mobilization, in addition to assisting the Regular Army (Active Force) in the defence of Canada. Two years later, when NATO formally adopted the doctrine of massive retaliation, the precedence of nuclear weapons and "forces in being", or regular forces, brought into question both traditional thinking about conventional warfare and, therefore, the mobilization requirements of the Militia. In order to "align" the Militia to the operational requirements of the Regular Army, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, assigned Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson to undertake a "secret" study to recommend reorganization for the Militia.⁴ Anderson's report, which examined ways to reorganize the Militia for augmentation duties, was overshadowed and dismissed by John Diefenbaker's election victory in 1957, when Major-General George Pearkes took on the job of Minister of National Defence.

Pearkes had for some time strongly favoured a civil defence role for the Militia, a role which had been in the hands of the Ministry of Health and Welfare since 1951. It appeared to be an opportune time for new ideas. Changing Canadian strategy in the mid-1950s dramatically altered the reserve force structure and how it was employed. The enemy's deployment of a thermonuclear capability and the means to drop it on North America generated an even greater shift in emphasis toward continental defence. The air defence system absorbed the bulk of the defence budget. Projects like the AVRO Arrow, BOMARC, and the sensor systems in the North took absolute priority. Consequently, more and more money was drained from supporting reserve forces. Mobilization was now considered a dead issue since there would not be enough time to mobilize during a nuclear war. The Auxiliary RCAF was decimated and most squadrons disbanded. Mothballed ships were paid off and scrapped and the Naval Reserve shrunk dramatically.

In that context, in 1959, the Diefenbaker Government assigned the role of civil defence and "national survival" duties to the Militia, mainly among the combat arms units. The Militia was converted to a National Survival rescue force and many units lost their heavy weapons and armoured vehicles. Some Militia units, however, retained their war-fighting capability. Budgetary cuts affected the forward-deployed Canadian brigade group in West Germany. A proportion of positions in that formation were now assigned to be filled by fly-over reinforcements. Throughout the 1960s, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group relied on 300 Militia and 100 regular force soldiers who were flown over for the NATO fall exercises. Exercise ORION SPECIAL became an annual event.⁵ On the whole, though, the Militia did not receive this new role well, largely because it flew in the face of traditional war-fighting and mobilization tasks. Indeed, some of that resentment remains within the larger Militia community today.

By 1961, many factors, including the development of the 'flexible response' strategy within NATO, rendered the nuclear defence role less urgent, and the Militia slowly reverted back to more conventional roles. More studies followed the election of the Liberal Government in 1963, including the defence reorganization that resulted in the unification of the armed services. Following Brigadier E.R. Suttie's report on Militia restructure and internal Army studies in 1964,

⁴ Tamara Sherwin, "From Total War to Total Force: Civil-Military Relations and the Canadian Army Reserve (Militia), 1945-1995" (M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1997)

⁵ Maloney, *War Without Battles* Ch. 4.

armouries were closed and Militia command structure was absorbed by the Regular Army. The Militia faced serious attrition as a result, dropping from 46,763 in 1964 to 19,855 in 1970.⁶

When NATO strategy shifted away from immediate nuclear weapons use towards a flexible response strategy in the late 1960s, NATO members were encouraged to improve the readiness and capabilities of their conventional forces. Forces in being were still important but mobilization for a long war increased in importance. The Canadian Government chose to cut the forces in Europe in half and ignore mobilization. The reserve forces, already depleted from personnel retention problems during the uninspiring National Survival role period, withered on the vine throughout the 1970s to the point where there were fewer reservists than regular force personnel.

Reserve personnel were employed during Operation GAMESCAN 76 for security and command and control activities. 1300 reservists from all three elements were directly involved in security duties, while 850 more assisted the Olympic Games in non-military support and communications roles. The Regatta Support Force in Kingston employed between 150 and 450 naval reserve personnel. Task Force Air employed Air Reserve squadrons flying Kiowa liaison helicopters.⁷

In terms of peace operations, the first Canadian overseas deployment to any UN mission, the United Nations Military Observer Group India Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, consisted of nine reserve officers, including Brigadier H.H. Angle, who was the Chief Military Observer until his death in 1950. Brigadier Angle was the first Canadian to die on a UN peace operation. There were no regular force officers assigned to UNMOGIP until later in the 1950s.

The only significant overseas operational employment of Militia personnel in the 1970s other than augmenting 4 Brigade in West Germany on Fall Exercise (FALLEX) (now in reduced numbers) was United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) deployed to the Middle East in the wake of the 1963 Yom Kippur War. The Canadian contingent for UNEF II consisted of an 1100-man augmented composite service battalion (73 Service Battalion) and a signals sub-unit (73 Signals Squadron). The overall unit was called Canadian Contingent United Nations Middle East (CCUNME) of which 10 to 15% of the personnel were Militia. CCUNME personnel rotated every six months from 1974 to 1979. Notably, CCUNME appears to have had the first CF women deployed on peacekeeping operations: 50 women were part of the 1978 rotation.⁸

⁶ Sherwin, p. 101.

⁷ See Special Olympic Edition of *Sentinel*, 1977/1.

⁸ Bill Aikman, "Canadians in the Middle East," *Sentinel* 1978/5 pp. 9-13; "Canada's Involvement: The UN and the Middle East," *Sentinel* 1974/4 pp. 6-12. The 10-15% is in part based on discussions with members who served with the various UNEF II rotations. Aikman quotes a figure of 75 reserve personnel for the 750-man contingent.

The Total Force Experiment

The formal adoption of Total Force as part of Canada's defence policy in the 1987 *White Paper* held for many the dawning of a new age in the status of the Reserves in Canada. In 1988, Patrick Crofton, Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence, remarked that:

Under the Total Force concept set out in the Government's White Paper, the Reserves are to become an integral part of Canada's defence structure on an equal footing with the Regular Forces. With relatively modest increases in funding, improvements to equipment, higher manpower levels and dedicated attention from the professionals within the Department of National Defence, the Reserves should re-emerge as a crucial pillar in Canada's security structure. In an era of soaring defence costs, the resuscitation of the Reserves will provide Canadians with more effective security for the dollars they spend on defence.⁹

The intricacies of reserve force policy in the formulation of the 1987 *White Paper* were complex but, in any case, a greater emphasis was placed on developing roles within a formalized mobilization structure in the event that war broke out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s. 4 Brigade augmentation was increased. An example of this was the decision to introduce the Merritt Cup competition amongst Militia armoured regiments. The winning unit was permitted to re-train a troop on the Lynx recce vehicles and deploy to augment the reconnaissance squadron in West Germany for the annual NATO FALLEX series. Reserve officers functioned as augmentees on practically every FALLEX, sometimes as umpires.

The Militia has since provided a flexible community-based organization for a variety of other tasks. We have analyzed the use of Reservists in CF operations over the past 13 years in some depth. While the following examples do not include all operations undertaken by the CF, they do demonstrate that the notion of complementary (adding breadth to those existing in the Regular Force) and supplementary (adding depth to those in the Regular Force) capabilities for the Reserves is not new.

Operation ? : Goose Bay Internal Security Operations

When CFB Goose Bay was selected as an aerial training range in 1988, Innu leaders attempted to block this plan and took the matter to court. Their appeal was struck down in 1989. Local Innu then started a civil disobedience campaign which included camping in the range area, infiltrating the base and blocking the runway, and conducting demonstrations modeled on the anti-nuclear Greenham Common activities of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Base Security forces were hard pressed to contain this organized activity and requested

⁹ Standing Committee on National Defence, *First Report on the White Paper on National Defence*, more specifically the question of Reserves (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1988), pp. 1-2.

augmentation. A composite Militia infantry company of approximately 100 men drawn from various Atlantic Militia Area units was deployed for several weeks.¹⁰

Operation CALUMET: Multinational Force and Observers

Throughout the 1990s, the Canadian Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) contingent, which monitors the Sinai peninsula to ensure that the Israeli Defence Forces left the region and that the Egyptians do not deploy forces in excess of treaty limits, hovered around 28 personnel, most of which were from Militia units.¹¹

Operation SALON: Oka, 1990

In March 1990 the Kanesatake Mohawks established the first barricade to block the Oka golf course expansion. In May, they then asked for Warrior Society assistance in resisting the expansion. On 30 June, the town of Oka received an injunction to get the Mohawks to remove the barricades. On 10 July, the barricades were reinforced and the next day 100 *Sécurité du Québec* (SQ) officers assaulted the Mohawk positions. The Kanesatake Mohawks, with Warrior's Society support, then created a barricade on the Mercier Bridge and on the highways running through that reserve. They then threatened to destroy the bridge if the SQ attacked the Kanesatake Mohawks again.¹²

While more Warrior's Society reinforcements flowed into the area (estimates suggest that there were 200 Warriors at Kanesatake and 400 at Khanawake),¹³ 4000 Chateauguay residents rioted and attacked the police, demanding that they re-open the route.¹⁴

On 8 August 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that 4000 troops were on standby. Three days later, Premier Bourassa met with Force Mobile Command (FMC) and SQ officials. After more rioting in Chateauguay, the Quebec government formally requested aid of the civil power. 2500 troops were then moved closer to the area of operations. They deployed to replace the police at the barricades on 20 August 1990. At the same time, residents in Lasalle built their own barricade at the north end of the Mercier Bridge while rioting in Chateauguay continued.¹⁵

¹⁰ Olive Patricia Dickason, *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 394-396; Marie Wadden, *Nitassinan: The Innu Struggle to Reclaim their Homeland* (Toronto: Douglas and Macintyre, 1991) Ch's 8, 14; discussions with Militia personnel who participated in the operation.

¹¹ Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) file 86/333 (26 Mar 79) "Canada's Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai"; M.R. Dabros, "The Multi-national force and Observers: A New Experience in Peacekeeping for Canada," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Autumn 1986 pp. 32-35; DNET Canadian Forces Current Operations Update as of 26 February 1999: Op CALUMET (MFO); conversations with Canadian MFO staff officers.

¹² Craig MacLain and Michael Baxendale, *This Land is Our Land: The Mohawk Revolt at Oka* (Montreal: Optimum Publishing International, Inc.) pp. 17-23.

¹³ J.A.Roy, "Operation SALON," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, April 1991, pp. 15-19.

¹⁴ Geoffrey York and Loreen Pindera, *People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of Oka* (Toronto: Little, Brown, and Co., 1991) Ch. 13.

¹⁵ Hornung, *One Nation Under the Gun*, Ch. 23.

Operation SALON was conducted by 5^e GBC which had two Van Doos battalions, an RCR battalion, 5 RALC, and part of 12 RBC. 12 RBC was in the process of rotating to and from UNFICYP and was caught short of personnel. Consequently, a troop from 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) (Militia) with Cougar AVGP's was tasked to augment 12 RBC. Approximately 100 infantrymen from 1 and 2 Battalions, Royal New Brunswick Regiment (Militia) deployed to Camp Farnham and were used for general duties. HMCS *Acadian* a Maritime Command patrol vessel manned by reservists, performed reconnaissance, observation, and liaison duties in concert with police and Army forces.¹⁶

Hagerstown Tire Dump Fire, 1990

Tyre King Recycling's 14 million tires caught fire and produced an environmental disaster threatening nearby communities. Ten local fire departments were called in to control the blaze. Members from the CF Fire Academy assisted, as did a Twin Huey from 427 THS. A Militia unit, 56 Field Regiment, RCA in Brantford, Ontario was involved in relocating evacuated civilians.¹⁷

Operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, 1991-1998

Canadian involvement in the collapse of the Balkans originally was through the CSCE which subcontracted peace observation to the European Community. The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) consisted of eight nations. The Canadian contingent consisted of 15 officers and was called Operation BOLSTER. The ECMM operated in Slovenia, then Croatia, and finally in and around Bosnia Herzegovina. Op BOLSTER existed from 1991 to 1994: its rotations were usually 15 regular personnel from all three elements. There are no indications that reserve personnel participated in Op BOLSTER.¹⁸

Once the UN got involved in an effort to mediate in Croatia, a large number of UN Military Officers, which included Canadian officers, deployed to the region. Numbers are not available, so it is impossible to determine the extent of reserve participation.

The Vance agreement of 1992 generated conditions for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to Croatia called UNPROFOR. The Canadian contribution to UNPROFOR was called Operation HARMONY. Op HARMONY was in place from 1992 to 1995. It consisted of the following rotations:

- Roto 0: 1139 personnel. This roto was based on 4 CMB units in Germany and no reserve forces. It included portions of 1 R22^eR and 3 RCR. 4 Combat Engineer Regiment deployed as a separate unit as the force engineer regiment.

¹⁶ Craig MacLain and Michael Baxendale, *This Land is Our Land: The Mohawk Revolt at Oka* (Montreal: Optimum Publishing International, Inc.) pp. 17-23; discussions with Militia personnel who participated in the operation.

¹⁷ Mike Fabbro, "Blazing Tires," *Sentinel* 1990/3 p. 40.

¹⁸ Sean M. Maloney *Operation BOLSTER: Canada and the European Community Monitor Mission 1991-1994* (Toronto: CISS, 1997).

- Roto 1: 860 personnel. 3 PPCLI, 1 Combat Engineer Regiment.
- Roto 2: 878 personnel. 2 PPCLI. This rotation had a significant Militia contribution. Approximately 30-40% of this battalion group consisted of Militia personnel.
- Roto 3: 739 personnel. 1 R22^eR, plus 1st Troop 56^e Escadron De Genie. Militia augmentation.
- Roto 4: 738 personnel. 1 PPCLI. Militia augmentation.
- Roto 5: 772 personnel. 1 RCR. Militia augmentation.
- Roto 6: 759 personnel. 2 R22^eR. Militia augmentation.¹⁹

The collapse of Bosnia in 1992 prompted the creation of UNPROFOR II. Unlike UNPROFOR I in Croatia, UNPROFOR II was designed initially to provide armed protection to humanitarian assistance in the region. The role quickly mutated into something very different. Canada's contribution to UNPROFOR II was called Operation CAVALIER.

- Roto 0: 1134 personnel. 2 RCR (-), 12 RBC squadron. This battle group had significant Militia augmentation.
- Roto 1: 2 R22^eR (-), 12 RBC squadron, 57^e Escadron De Genie
- Roto 2: 12 RBC (-), 1 R22^eR company, 56^e Escadron De Genie
- Roto 3: LdSH (-), 1 PPCLI company, squadron from 1 CER
- Roto 4: RCD (-), company from 2 RCR, engineer squadron from 2 CER
- Roto 5: 3 R22^eR (-), 12 RBC armoured squadron, and engineer squadron from 5 RGC. This battle group had significant Militia augmentation: it was a Total force battalion group which contained, in part, a composite company with 5 RALC personnel and Militia personnel.²⁰

The provision of Forward Air Controllers to Op CAVALIER in 1993 was called Operation PANORAMA. It consisted of 12 FACs in three rotations. None appear to have been Air Reserve personnel. Operation MANDARIN was the provision of a logistics battalion to support Op HARMONY and Op CAVALIER. Op MANDARIN started out as a 113-man Support Group and was increased to 271 personnel and called CANLOGBAT. Op MANDARIN rotations were all augmented with Militia personnel, particularly drivers. All three regular force

¹⁹ Compiled from various DND information sources. (In many cases, individual augmentees were not recorded separately on internal documentation from the numbers of deployed regular force personnel. Public DND documents describing operations generally do not break down the deployed personnel numbers.)

²⁰ Compiled from various DND information sources.

service battalions in Canada provided the basis for each rotation. Operation SPEAKER was the communications element for Canadian operations in the FRY. There were four rotations each consisting of 60-80 personnel. Again, Op SPEAKER had reserve augmentation.²¹

The demise of UN operations in the FRY after the Dayton Accords resulted in their replacement with a NATO peacekeeping force called Implementation Force (IFOR). The Canadian contribution to IFOR, called Op ALLIANCE, had 1,047 personnel in a composite organization that consisted of a recce squadron, a mechanized infantry company, an engineer squadron, and NCE and an NSE. There were two Op ALLIANCE rotations. IFOR was replaced with Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996. Canada's contribution, Operation PALLADIUM, has 1327 personnel. It is an infantry battalion group, a recce squadron, engineer squadron, an administrative company, and NCE and NSE. All Op PALLADIUM rotations have significant individual Militia augmentation. There have been seven Op PALLADIUM rotations thus far.²²

Operation RECUPERATION: Ontario and Quebec, 1998

Alternating warm and cold temperatures produced an environmental system which deposited vast amounts of freezing rain on southern Quebec and eastern Ontario. This storm disabled the power grid for the Kingston-Montreal corridor for several weeks while temperatures plummeted. Montreal was particularly hard hit. CF aid to the civil authorities included the deployment of 14,160 CF personnel, of which 3,000 were reserve personnel. Militia sub-units were flown into the operational area from as far away as Newfoundland for the duration of Op RECUPERATION.²³

Operation PERSISTENCE: Nova Scotia, 1998

The crash of a SwissAir Flight 111 airbus aircraft off Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia resulted in a massive Major Air Disaster (MAJAD) operation conducted jointly between the CF and OGD's. The following vessels participated in Op PERSISTENCE:

HMCS <i>Halifax</i> (FFH)	HMCS <i>Okanagan</i> (SSK)
HMCS <i>Preserver</i> (AOR)	HMCS <i>Ville de Quebec</i> (FFH)
HMCS <i>Kingston</i> (MCDV)	HMCS <i>Moncton</i> (MCDV)
HMCS <i>Goose Bay</i> (MCDV)	HMCS <i>Glace Bay</i> (MCDV)
HMCS <i>Anticosti</i> (MCM)	4 X Sea King
4 X Aurora	3 X Labrador

The MCDV's *Kingston*, *Goose Bay*, *Glace Bay*, and *Moncton* were partly manned by naval reserve personnel, as was *Anticosti*. In addition, personnel from Land Forces Atlantic Area,

²¹ Compiled from various DND information sources.

²² Compiled from various DND information sources.

²³ DND Fact Sheet, "Operation RECUPERATION: CF Assistance to Civil Authorities in Quebec and Ontario." It should be noted that higher figures both for Regular and Reserve forces deployed have been circulated in the public domain, but we can not confirm them.

the bulk of them from Nova Scotia-based Militia units in 36 Canadian Brigade Group, were involved in recovery and control efforts on shore. Existing documentation does not provide numbers. Naval reserve diving personnel were also employed.²⁴

Operation PREAMBLE: Toronto, 1999

The LFCA Immediate Reaction Unit, the RCD, was called in to clear snow during and after a typical winter storm in Toronto. The RCD deployed 550 personnel including armoured ambulances, while 32 Canadian Brigade Group, the Toronto Militia command element, called in 100 members to clear snow.²⁵

Operation OCTAL: Toronto, 1999

Op OCTAL was a six-month operation mandated by the Minister of National Defence. It turned over the Fort York armouries in Toronto to local relief agencies so that the building could be used as a homeless shelter.²⁶

Operation ABACUS: Canada, 2000

Widespread concern generated fear that information-based systems might collapse at midnight on 1 Jan 2000. The Canadian Government chose to task the Canadian Forces with formulating a Canada-wide contingency plan involving 14,000 regular force members and 11,000 reservists to stand by in case this happened. Operation ABACUS was designed to respond to any form of disorder generated by the partial or total collapse of society. Fortunately, nothing occurred to warrant the use of military forces.²⁷

In other cases, the CF has been reluctant to employ Reservists. A few examples here provided demonstrate the complexities of applying Total Force ideals.

The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991

Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait in 1990 produced a massive UN-backed multinational response led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Canada chose to deploy three ships in August 1990 (Operation FRICTION): HMCS *Athabaskan*, HMCS *Terra Nova* and HMCS *Protecteur* with four Sea King helicopters. In the fall of 1990 Canada then committed two squadrons of CF-18 fighters (Operation SCIMITAR) 439 and 416 Squadrons, and a ground security element infantry company from the infantry battalions from 4 CMBG in Germany. This joint force was composed mostly of regular force personnel. It is difficult from existing sources to determine whether or not the deployed units were augmented with individual

²⁴ Bernard Potvin, "Defence Answers Disaster Call," *Maple Leaf* 15 September 1998.

²⁵ Ken Reynolds, "Turning Swords into Snowshovels?: Recent Trends in Domestic Operations by the Canadian Forces," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Vol. 2 No. 2 May 1999, pp. 60-62."

²⁶ Jon O'Connor, "Taking Back the Fort: Op OCTAL to End," *Maple Leaf* 17 November 1999 Vol. 2 No. 21.

²⁷ Allison Delaney, "Y2K Meltdown was a no-show but the CF was prepared," *Maple Leaf* 19 January 2000 Vol. 3 No. 1.

Air Reserve or Naval Reserve personnel, though at least one reserve EW unit member was part of the CATGME HQ.²⁸

A ground force contingency plan, Operation BROADSWORD, was then formulated. BROADSWORD was to consist of an independent Brigade Group based on 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Germany, but with substantial augmentation from 5 GBC and 1 CBG in Canada. Plans were drawn up to mobilize Militia units as battle casualty replacements, but the lack of job protection legislation in part deterred planners from examining this aspect in detail.²⁹

Instead of sending a brigade group, Canada sent a field hospital (Operation SCALPEL). Given the state of the Canadian Forces Medical System ensured that there was only nine surgeons and nine anaesthetists in the entire CF. Calls to Militia field ambulances produced no volunteers at all from Militia doctors because there was no job protection legislation. The entire CF was stripped of all of its doctors for the duration of the conflict so that the field hospital could be operational.³⁰

Operation ASSIST: Turkey, 1991

Operation ASSIST was the Canadian contingent for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the humanitarian relief effort to the Kurds in northern Iraq and southern Turkey in the wake of the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Op PROVIDE COMFORT consisted of 22,000 personnel from nine countries. Op ASSIST was designed to assist the Kurdish refugees in the border area. 4 Field Ambulance was deployed from West Germany (4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade) to Turkey aboard CF strategic airlift. Two C-130s and a 707 were dedicated to the in-theatre air life, while 40 vehicles and 62 members of 4 Field Ambulance were based in Incirlik, Turkey. A total of 122 CF personnel were involved in the operation. There is no indication that reserve personnel were employed in Op ASSIST.³¹

Operation CENTRAL: Honduras, 1998

This Disaster Assistance response Team (DART) Deployment was conducted in response to the massive damage caused by Hurricane Mitch. Approximately 140 regular personnel were deployed with no reserve augmentation. Four Griffon helicopters from 427 Squadron also deployed with a control element and a 30-MP security element for the helicopters.³²

²⁸ See David N. Deere, *Desert Cats: The Canadian Fighter Squadrons in the Gulf War* (Stoney Creek, Fortress Publications, 1991); Jean Morin and Richard Gimblett, *Operation Friction 1990-1991* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1994) and Duncand Miller and Sharon Hobson, *The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War* (Toronto: CISS, 1995); *Belonging: The Reserve Electronic Warfare Squadron, Kingston 1986-1996* (Kingston: Brown and Martin, 1996) pp. 41-42.

²⁹ Sean M. Maloney, "Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Brigade and the Gulf War, 1990-1991," *Canadian Military History* Vol. 4 No. 1 Spring 1995 pp. 36-46.

³⁰ Gimblett and Morin, *Operation FRICTION*, p. 217.

³¹ ATI DND (6 May 91) Commander CFE Letter of Instruction of OC Op ASSIST Task Group"; "Operation ASSIST: CF Participation in the Multinational Effort to aid the Iraqi Refugees."

³² Genevieve Bouchard, "Ayuda," *Maple Leaf* 15 December 1998; "Herculean Effort in Honduras," *Maple Leaf* 15 January 1999.

Operation ASSISTANCE: Manitoba, 1997

Operation ASSISTANCE was the massive domestic operation conducted by the CF to mitigate the effects of the great Red River Flood of 1997. Initially Land Forces western Area HQ was tasked to handle the operation, but the scope of it necessitated more manpower and resources. LFWA tasked 1 Canadian Brigade Group and 38 Canadian Brigade Group (immediate reaction units totalling 1,200 personnel regular and Militia) and AIRCOM resources to act as the first responders to the flood. 38 CBG is a Militia brigade. As the situation developed, 1 Canadian Division was brought in to act as the Joint Task Force HQ. As of 30 April, 7,500 CF personnel were committed to Op ASSISTANCE and by 1 May this increased to 8,400, and eventually peaked at 8,600. The bulk of the personnel were committed to sandbag deployment and removal, patrols, and re-entry operations. Twelve Griffon, three Labrador, three Sea King, ten Kiowas, two DASH-8 and two Aurora aircraft were committed by AIRCOM.³³

CF Current Operations update through the course of Op ASSISTANCE provided the numbers of personnel on the operation provided by Area, but did not distinguish between reserve and regular personnel. At the peak of Op ASSISTANCE, the forces committed included:³⁴

JFHQ	498
Land Forces Western Area	3139
Land Forces Central Area	2182
Land Forces Atlantic Area	273
Secteur du Québec de	
la Force Terrestre	519
Maritime Command	360
Air Command	1597

Maps on the DND web site only showed regular force units on them and no reserve units. 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group from Petawawa received inordinate mention in DND despatches as the 'cavalry to rescue' but the deployment of reserve units or their personnel from other parts of the country received no mention whatsoever.³⁵

Internal documentation indicates that only two reserve companies from 38 Canadian Brigade Group were involved in Op ASSISTANCE. The primary reason for not employing more reserve personnel apparently was related to the lack of a disability insurance plan or supplementary death benefit in the event of accident.³⁶

³³ ATI DND, "Recap of Key Events-Op NOAH/Op ASSISTANCE (Assistance to Manitoba Flooding Apr/May 97)."

³⁴ Canadian Forces Current Operations Update: Disaster Relief Assistance, 29 April -13 May 1997.

³⁵ Canadian Forces Current Operations Update: Disaster Relief Assistance, 29 April -13 May 1997.

³⁶ (19 Nov 97) "Operation ASSISTANCE: Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive."

The Post-Cold War Security Environment

Canada is not alone among its allies in struggling with the new strategic, operational and tactical demands of the post Cold War world. Indeed, the United States, Britain and Canada have each attempted to make their Reserve forces more 'relevant' to current operational demands because of the decrease in their overall resource base and the increasing range of operations for which governments are committing armed forces. NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999 reflects this trend, stating that: "the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary."³⁷ It is therefore indisputable that Canada needs its Reserves now, possibly more than at any time since the Second World War. The Canadian Forces leadership agrees. Indeed, Armed Forces Council has derived a planning figure of 20% Reserve augmentation for operational deployments. Although Reserve augmentation for CF operations hovered just above 7% during 1999,³⁸ a modernized, revitalized and viable Reserves, properly equipped, funded and supported could provide for the 20% goal.

How is this to be achieved? No reform of the Militia for political or operational reasons has resulted in a more viable, efficient or "relevant" force, yet the Militia has continued to be called on for a wide variety of tasks beyond the reach of a niche structure. Perhaps the part-time, citizen soldier base of the Militia is not suited to the vagaries of responding to short or long term shifts in forecasts of the strategic environment. Furthermore, many reservists we have consulted with insist that the most multi-purpose force is a combat capable force, which would mitigate against a heavy re-rolling of combat arms units to combat service and combat service support. In the recently published *Strategy 2020*, the Department and the CF have laid out several objectives in order to achieve a task-tailored, globally deployable modern force that will keep pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). As the VCDS Force Structure Guidance is derived from that institutional strategy, it is informative that the defence establishment seems to be attempting to fit the Reserves into the capstone vision of 2020:

The Defence Team will generate, employ and sustain high quality, combat-capable, inter-operable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces. We will exploit leading edge technologies to accomplish our domestic and international roles in the battlespace of the 21st century and be recognized, both at home and abroad, as an innovative, relevant, knowledge-based institution. With transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in pursuit of clear strategic objectives.

The future security environment is complex, and the impact of technology on many of the CF's operations will no doubt be significant. Other tasks such as holding ground in peace support operations or war-fighting might be more personnel intensive. Maintaining a judicious

³⁷ *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington*, 23-25 April 1999, p. 57.

³⁸ VCDS response to MMC Request re: Militia Personnel on Operations, 29 November 1999.

balance between technology and personnel requirements has been, and will continue to be, one of the biggest challenges to defence policy-makers and military planners. *Strategy 2020*, however, scantily mentions the Reserves or manpower-intensive scenarios, the implications of which have been criticized by many defence analysts, including Major-General (Ret'd) Clive Addy, who warns against the strategic straight-jacket potentially facing the CF in the form of "one spot, one shot armed forces."³⁹ Because of the fundamentally distinct nature of the Army Reserves, characterized by its part-time and discretionary terms of engagement, this may not be the most prudent direction for its future.

Despite these misgivings, it is not our mandate to advise you on what roles to assign the Reserves. In advising you on the way ahead, however, it is clear to us that it remains an open debate for all Canadians interested in the future of Canada's armed forces. Therefore, while emphasizing that there is solid support for change within the broader reserves community, we are convinced that no successful restructure can occur without a comfortable degree of consensus on the objectives, process and rationale of restructuring. As it stands, a lack of publicly accessible information, combined with serious mistrust of NDHQ, has only resulted in further anxiety within the reserves community as the LFRR process has developed. In our consultations, we have likened some of the "dialogue of the deaf" between NDHQ and the reserves community to that of a nasty divorce, where each of the parties has given up trying to convince the other of what went wrong and how to move ahead in an agreed fashion, and has begun rather to assert their claims of entitlement, clinging stubbornly to past wrongs.

Drudging up old stories of Regular-Reserve animosity is, however, neither productive nor conducive to bringing about a resolution to the impasse in reserve restructuring. That impasse exists due to the dual nature of the reserve restructuring process as a matter within the spheres both of public policy and the military chain-of-command. Each party in the process (NDHQ and the broader reserves community) holds a key element of successful restructure: NDHQ holds administrative and budgetary control of the Reserves, while the reserve community, as citizen soldiers subject to the chain of command at their discretion, must be willing to participate in a restructured Army Reserves.

Real progress on reserve restructure will only happen if the political and institutional dimensions of decision-making are clearly articulated, and a transparent measurement apparatus is put in place to check progress. Throughout our monitoring of reserves matters since our mandate began, we have used ministerial decisions as the benchmark by which to measure progress. That direction was derived from the 1994 *White Paper*, the SCRR and subsequent direction given by ministers.

³⁹ Major-General (Ret'd) Clive John Addy, "One Spot, One Shot Armed Forces... or Not", in *Vanguard*, volume 6, Issue 2, 2000, p. 6.

The Reserve Restructure Process: Chronology of Events

1. The 1992 Auditor-General's Report urged improvements in Canada's reserve force.
2. The hearings that preceded the 1994 *White Paper* brought forth a number of options for Canada's military structure to respond to the post Cold War world. One high profile action group, Canada 21 Council, recommended the re-orientation of the CF away from heavy combat capability to lighter constabulary roles, proposing that Canada "choose to abstain from any international operations that include the possibility of attacks by heavy armoured formations, heavy artillery, or modern airpower."⁴⁰
3. The 1994 *White Paper* confirmed in policy the requirement for the CF to deliver "combat capable, multi-purpose" capability, including a rejuvenated Reserves, with a force structure based on 23,000 Reserves by 1999, and a national mobilization plan based on the four-stage mobilization framework laid out in the *White Paper*. The *White Paper* states that "... while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready "no cost" plans for "national mobilization." This plan was to be the basis for reserve restructuring. In reference to the Reserves, the White paper also visits the possibility of "assigning more service support roles - such as medical, logistics, communications and transport functions - to the Reserves."
4. 5 April 1995: Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves established.
5. 30 October 1995: SCRR submits report to Minister. From the Executive Summary:

In any restructuring of the reserves, care must be taken to prepare for all eventualities. The Commissioners believe that, while the mobilization concept offered in the 1994 White Paper on defence is appropriate, the priorities given to its four phases fail to recognize that the fundamental role of the Reserve Force is to provide the mobilization base for war. Such a role should be paramount in planning, and a mobilization plan should be completed with dispatch.... The Commissioners conclude that the peacetime Militia must be organized and trained to provide augmentation for the regulars and to be capable of expansion to meet mobilization needs. The mobilization plan for the Army, therefore, should be based on the formation of a corps. While much of this structure would be notional at present, a corps provides an effective framework for force development.

6. 7 May 1996: DND's Chief, Force Development stated before SCONDVA, alongside the Minister of National Defence, that "In terms of tasking for the reserve, we envisage that each reserve unit in Canada, as a part of the mobilization planning process, will be given specific

⁴⁰ Canada 21 Council, *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, 1994), p. 64.

tasks that will relate to the four stages of mobilization." The MND, during the same session, gave the government's action plan to carry out the recommendations of the SCRR (and others...). He also, however, stated the following:

First of all, let me address the concerns voiced by many with respect to the primary reserve force strength of 23,000, as set out in the white paper. We understand this figure simply will not be enough to meet operational requirements. The paid ceiling of the primary reserves will therefore be increased from the planned reduction figure of 23,000, to a level that could, with increased efficiencies, allow for an actual primary reserve strength of around 30,000. The militia will be the beneficiary of this increase as its paid ceiling will rise from 14,500, the original figure with which the special commission had to work. The militia will be organized into brigades, the exact number to be determined after future study by land force planners and, again, consultations with the reserve community. All along in this piece, Madam Chair, the reserve community will be active participants and advisers and work with the forces.

7. 10 June 1996: Initial VCDS Action Directive D4/96 of 10 June 1996 provided the following: MND Direction: (a) Increase the strength of the Primary Reserve from planned reduction figure of 23,000 to around 30,000. The Militia would be the "beneficiary" of this 7,000 increase.
8. 19 September 1996: LFRR Business Case Sub-Process: para. 4. "The final reorganization of Land Force Reserve units will be determined by the LFRR process based on unit evaluations and a final structure approved by the Minister." Also, in Annex A of this document: 5. Staffing guidelines (for restructure process): "Decisions must be made as a result of the consultative process." In same annex, # 7. "Transparency: All actions associated with the LFRR must be and seen to be as open as possible. It is imperative that Reservists, Honouraries and members of the broad reserve community be directly involved in all aspects of the process."
9. 15 November 1996: Commander's Intent establishes Consultative Working Groups at the direction of MND.
10. 21 November 1996: MND testified before SCONDVA, stating that force totals for the Militia would be increased to 18,500 to 20,500. He accepts the 36 SCRR recommendations, including a national mobilization plan, which would be the basis of restructure (corps).
11. 20 December 1996: CLS Action Directive - Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) states, among other things, that the "mobilization capability is the fundamental reason for the existence of the Land Force Reserves. The Directive states that restructure will be carried out based on a "paid ceiling" of 18,500. It is stated in para 27 that "In order to support the LFRR process, funding will remain constant at the 18,500 paid ceiling level until FY 1999/2000. During the evaluation period monies allocated to Areas for Reserve pay and personnel related O&M must be used for that purpose and may not be sub allocated for other purposes without the authority of Commander LFC." In Annex A to this document, it is

stated that..."no combat function should be generated exclusively from the Militia structure" March 1997: MND Report to the Prime Minister directs force totals of 60,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves.

Yet, certain changes in direction can be detected that were neither sanctioned by the Government nor opened up for broad discussion. Some of the more significant of these decisions that had an impact on the restructuring process are as follows:

12. October 1997: CLS announces FY 98/99 Special Resource Measures. Included is a one time \$16.9 million reduction of Militia budget. However, CLS states that the Army Primary Reserve paid ceiling remains at 18,500 and that class A training days will remain at 65 annually. He also states that he will review impact of the cut at the local level so that the impact on units is minimized and uniformly applied so as not to affect viability assessments adversely. "The Reserve Advisor will be reviewing this situation so we can clearly identify the localized impact to offer all possible assurances that this situation will not put the current evaluation process out of balance."
13. 30 October 1997: Army Bulletin message from the CLS: 18,500 will remain in place despite cuts.
14. November 1997: LFRR Total Force Task Force: Refined the concept of Total Force, developing and defining "characteristics of Reg and Res components" This is incorporated into the first publication of the Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance in the summer of 1998.
15. 7 August 1998: Minister's Monitoring Committee requests information on how budget cut has affected units. Initial letter from the CLS suggests that cuts have had affect but more analysis needed.
16. November 1998: Proposed Mobilization Framework circulated to Environmental Chiefs.
17. November 1998: MMC 1998 Interim Report:

It has been four years since the 1994 White Paper established the development of these plans as Government policy, and two years since the Minister accepted the SCRR recommendations that mobilization planning must be a top priority of the Department. The Monitoring Committee is not convinced that mobilization planning has received sufficient priority. The Committee does note, however, that some work was done on the economic impact of national mobilization for Exercise DEFENCE PLANNER, held recently at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. Further, the Reserve Advisor to the Chief of the Land Staff is presently engaged actively in formulating proposals for a mobilization plan.

The absence of a plan creates uncertainty for the Reserves. The Reserves are, by virtue of Government policy, the basis for national mobilization, or Stage 4. In

practice, however, the Department has paid attention to their augmentation role almost exclusively. A recent DND publication entitled Canada's Defence Team in Action, states simply that "the militia augments and sustains the Regular Force". The document notes that militia members are trained to serve alongside regulars, in addition to maintaining a link to their communities, but fails to mention the Militia's primary role: to be the basis of national mobilization. As it stands, the Department has provided no details of the Reserves' role in either Stages 3 or 4. The SCRR recommended that the role of the Reserves be defined for Stages 3 and 4 to reassure the Militia, Air and Naval Reserves that the "community-based unit system that has served this country well in the past will be expected to do so again in the future." The Monitoring Committee notes that Reservists have not, as yet, been reassured, but remains hopeful that this will be remedied.

18. 28 January 1999: Record of Discussion -- Command Consultative Working Group (CCWG) 3/98 -- Held in NDHQ Ottawa 22-23 October 1998, states that "The Asst Res Adv provided an update on the LFRR process and the importance of this meeting of the CCWG. The CLS then led a discussion on the synchronization of the LFRR process and the Departmental business planning process."
19. 4 February 1999: CLS Planning Directive issued that includes a timeline for LFRR implementation. SWG to report in mid-April, and MND approval in principal to be sought in mid-May 1999.
20. 25 February 1999: CCWG approves LFRR structure process, which essentially directs the SWG to arrive at structure options based on the amount of money made avail by the Army (\$160 million), based on operation requirements, tenets and assumptions, and establishments.
21. 19 March 1999: Mobilization Planning Framework established as Action Directive by the VCDS to the Environments to work up their own mobilization frameworks. No detailed allocation of units to assigned roles or tasks is provided.
22. 10 April 1999: Assistant Reserve Advisor to the CLS, presentation to Structural Working Group: "Unit evaluations only provide data for structuring decisions."
23. 10-12 April 1999: Structural Working Group produces proposal based on the tenets, assumptions and "operational requirements" provided by a Land Staff Working Group. Heavy emphasis on support roles. Correspondence between the CLS and *Reserves 2000* outlines the impasse in the consultative process.
24. 15-16 May 1999: Army Council meets to discuss options for restructure. CLS Reserve Advisor in attendance and only reserve officer. They looked at 'options' based on five factors: budget of \$160 million for FY 2000/2001; force balance between combat, combat support and combat service support branches; national geography; "emerging requirement" to force generate for "National Level Units"; the need to respond effectively to "domestic emergencies." Army Council came up with a proposal which would be funded at 85% of ceiling, or 11,752 Class A Reservists (part-time), 888 Class A, 933 Class B and 895 Regular

Force. The Army Council states that "if realistic attendance rates were applied, this model would include a total of 15,701 Class A personnel, which would be an increase in the real effective strength of the Militia from current levels."

25. July 1999: MMC Interim Report is made public, stating that:

In its first Interim Report, the Monitoring Committee expressed concern that contingent commanders had little motivation to include formed Militia elements in augmentation roles. The Committee is in receipt of no evidence that this situation has changed, and is disappointed that no efforts appear to be in the works to encourage change. The Militia would no doubt be boosted both in spirits and status within the Army community if formed platoons and sections were included in levels one and two mobilization, at the very least, and given ample warning and resources to prepare for deployment on a continuing and rotational basis. Such a planning and deployment regime would enhance reserve leadership and training, in addition to exposing Militia units to some of the problems involved in mobilization planning and operational readiness likely in stages three and four of mobilization. Until such a commitment has been made by the Army Commander, the Committee can not help but disagree with the view that this recommendation has been implemented.

The Reserves have three fundamental roles within the Canadian Forces: to serve as the basis of national mobilization; to augment the Regular Force; and to act as the military's link to the community. These roles are not mutually exclusive. Maintaining a link to the community, for example, facilitates the ability of the Reserves to prepare for their ultimate purpose of national mobilization by recruiting, training and maintaining a level of operational readiness. Exposure to the military informs Canadians, which is a requirement for public support of the military. Units, sub units, sub-sub units and individuals who are equipped, motivated and trained for national mobilization are also the most able to move into augmentation roles.

While the three roles of the reserves may not be separable, it must be noted that, without proper emphasis on their national mobilization role, the Army reserves in particular will continue to be at the mercy of Regular Force priorities, and the operational base from which they would expand will continue to decline. The SCRR recommended the drafting and implementation of a mobilization plan, based on a corps and divisional structure, as a means to put an end to that regression. The Department's choice not to draft such a plan, preferring instead to devise a rather sparse framework of vague intentions to guide mobilization, is therefore inadequate and disappointing. The recommendation has not been fulfilled, and the Reserves have no more of a defined role in the stages of mobilization than was in place before the framework was drafted. Indeed, there are no detailed assignments of formed Militia units whatsoever; as a consequence, the Mobilization Framework contributes little to the aforementioned

recommendation concerning the deployment of formed Militia units on peacekeeping operations.

The Monitoring Committee is therefore puzzled why the Department has decided not to embrace the opportunity to engage itself, the CF and other government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the development of a comprehensive national mobilization plan. The Department's contention that such planning can only be done when a situation has arisen is also puzzling. The purpose of planning is to identify likely 'situations' and to devise methods, processes and, most importantly, force structures, to respond to them. Such planning is invaluable not only to the development of intellectual rigour in the CF, but also to the Department's ability generally to forecast commitments, measure necessary resources and communicate Canada's military requirements to the Canadian Government and public.

As it stands, the Monitoring Committee is unable to accept the Department's insistence that these recommendations are implemented, and urges the Department to reconsider its hesitancy to devise a national mobilization plan.

26. February 2000: MMC Final Report summarizes the state of progress on original Government direction:

SCRR recommendations accepted by the Minister of National Defence were based on these basic premises held by the Commissioners. Since the Commissioners released their report, the Militia was to have benefited by an increase in personnel of 7,000, which would have boosted their ranks to at least 18,500 soldiers. That has not happened. In addition, although the initial Chief of the Land Staff directive on LFRR directed that "mobilization capability is the fundamental reason for the existence of the Land Force Reserves", it is not mobilization, but augmentation, that has gripped planning concepts over the past two years. No national mobilization plan exists. A lack of clarity over the Militia's missions and roles has persisted, and this has affected considerations of force structure, personnel policies and enabling legislation. This has cast a shadow over the process. Because Militia strength has fallen far below the mandated 18,500 (and even below the 14,500 given as a guideline to the SCRR Commissioners), training has been cut, various SCRR recommendations have been abandoned and a lack of communication between the regular and reserve force communities persists. Consultations between the Army and the reserve community, also directed by the Minister, have broken down. This has caused an impasse in restructuring deliberations, and the Minister has since deferred decisions on restructuring proposals being prepared by the Army.

27. 30 March 2000: John Fraser's letter to MND suggesting seven recommendations that can help to get the reserve restructure process back on track:

Since our last report, we have undertaken further study of the myriad

problems related to reserve restructuring. We are considering operational requirements in light of recent history, current operations and the tasks the CF will likely be called upon by the government to execute in the future. The future security environment is complex, and the impact of technology on many of the CF's operations will no doubt be significant. Other tasks such as holding ground in peace support operations or war-fighting might be more personnel intensive. Maintaining a judicious balance between technology and personnel requirements has been, and will continue to be, one of the biggest challenges to defence policy-makers and military planners.

Such strategic thinking is vital to deliberations on force structure both for the Regular and the Reserve forces. The Department and the CF have produced several documents recently that reflect institutional strategy (i.e. Strategy 2020, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff's Force Structure Guidance: "Rethinking the Total Force", Joint Mobilization Doctrine). In addition, the Army is implementing a new Reserve Funding Model and a new Army Reserve Establishment on 1 April. The Army Commander issued a directive concerning the creation of new capabilities within the Army Reserves on March 2nd. The Army has stated that these activities are not LFRR. Yet, the new funding model cuts reserve pay by approximately \$30 million. The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff has reported to me that he has "made available an additional \$30 million for the Army Reserve Programme beginning in FY 2001/02. These funds will be used to provide equipment and training to units undertaking new roles and tasks."

Since you have made no decision regarding reserve restructure, it is puzzling that new roles and tasks are being considered for implementation on 1 April. We are still not confident about what the above activities really mean, but there clearly is a strategy to have restructuring activities commence by 1 April despite the fact that there is no consensus.

28. 1 April 2000: New Army Reserves Establishments and the new Funding Model have been implemented, but we are still very unclear on the details or implications of these changes.

Concurrently with the events noted above, corporate work within NDHQ has been ongoing which appears to be developing a "strategic direction" for the Reserves. This is embodied in the following documents and processes:

- DND/CF Mobilization Planning Framework, developed between November 1998 and March 1999, which determined that Regular and Reserve components should produce complementary, not competitive, capabilities;
- The Military Occupational Structure Review II, carried out between October 1998 and May 1999, revealed gaps in combat support and combat service support trades required for deployment of the Vanguard and Main Contingency Force (Stages 1 and 2 of mobilization). The MOS review identified the Reserves as the generator of these capabilities;

- The National Level Units Working Group, which ran parallel to the MOS Review II, concluded that MCF National Level Units will include 30% Reserve manning;
- The LFRR Structure Working Group, which met from 10-12 April 1999 identified a need in the Army for more combat support and combat service support and less combat arms capability;
- The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Force Structure Guidance, *Rethinking the Total Force*, published in November 1999, lays out a case for aligning reserve capabilities with the operational requirements currently faced by the Canadian Forces. This document argues that Canada's allies are following the same force development principles, which are aimed at eliminating "anachronistic" structures that the CF can no longer afford. This document identifies "non-traditional" capabilities for the Reserves, mainly in the areas of combat support and combat service support, which would be more relevant to current operations than the panoply of combat arms units that do not contribute to the CF's "core capabilities." Significantly, the VCDS document outlines a "Reserve Mission", which is proposed as follows:

*The Reserves will, as an essential part of the order of battle, (1) provide individual and formed unit augmentation, at specified states of readiness, for operations across the spectrum of conflict in order to enable the Canadian Forces to mount and sustain operations; (2) build and maintain links between the Canadian Forces and the local communities; and (3) expand as directed to achieve national mobilization objectives.*⁴¹

- Chief of the Land Staff Intent issued on 2 March 2000 puts forth the case for new capabilities to be found in the Army Reserve. This document states that this process is required as part of the normal force development process, and therefore it is not part of LFRR.

⁴¹ VCDS Force Structure Guidance, *Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century*, p.16

The Way Ahead: Recommendations

The three main areas of reserve restructure which are matters of public policy, and therefore require ministerial, rather than military chain of command, direction are: mobilization planning as it relates to the *raison d'être* and roles of the reserves; personnel levels of the reserves and the role of the broader reserve community in reaching decisions related to the restructuring of the reserves. As it stands, we have reported that the Department and the CF have not fulfilled original direction on these matters. Our initial report to you on 30 March pointed out that the Militia has continued to shrink since 1996, with a strength now below 12,000. Mobilization planning beyond Stage 2, which would necessitate force expansion beyond the status quo, has not been given sufficient attention beyond a framework for consideration. Finally, consultation outside the senior levels of the chain of command effectively ended in April 1999. As we have pointed out on many occasions, consultation and debate involving the broader reserve community is not just a requirement to achieve consensus on decisions made by NDHQ, but rather a critical input to those decisions while they are being made. The Militia, after all, is what T.C. Willett, in his study of the Canadian Militia as a social institution, called a "hybrid" embracing "both military and civilian ideologies and practices", wherein "voluntary work by people who are not occupying any functional position is very important."⁴²

Your goal of creating a modernized Reserves can be achieved if the strategic direction in which NDHQ wants to take the Reserves proceeds in concert with specific up-front measures to address widely acknowledged recruiting, training, retention administration, equipment and resource problems that have contributed to the deterioration of the current Militia structure. By doing so, you will be well on the way to re-building the trust or 'buy in' from the reserve community required for the long-term success of your objectives, which can only be built on declarations and demonstrations of openness, transparency and clear lines of accountability.

ADMINISTRATION

Throughout our monitoring duties, and thereafter our consultations specifically on reserve restructuring, we have encountered numerous examples of how administrative and personnel policies treat the Reserves as a 'square peg in a round hole'.

For instance, there is little doubt that Total Force training standards represent one of the main sources of discontent within the Militia. To expect a part-time soldier to reach the standards of a full-time professional is a recipe for frustration and resentment. We are aware that the Regular Army acknowledges this problem, and is putting some effort into developing "Reservist-friendly" training packages.

⁴² T.C. Willett, *Canada's Militia: A Heritage at Risk* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 100.

Regardless, we have heard of far too many situations where training requirements simply fail to account for the exigencies of reserve service. Some examples are:

- cancelled training;
- being bumped from courses in favour of Regular soldiers;
- travelling long distances for centralized courses;
- excessive cost to reserve brigades for the implementation of the revised pay system, which, the SCRR recommendation stated, was not to have been taken out of the reserve budget;
- training at times of the year and of a length that discourages Reservists from participating.

Centralized recruiting is also not fulfilling the needs of many units. Many Reservists are frustrated that advertising for the Reserves is often marketed as a job rather than a part-time vocation, while others point out that they have not been allowed to reach local groups with appropriate advertising for the community.

Recommendation #1: Steps should be taken and announced to fix chronic problems in the way the reserves system is administered.

- Recruiting: more flexibility and authority to local reserve authorities to design advertising to suit local conditions and needs, and to appeal to local target groups.
- Enrolment: simplify and shorten the enrolment process. Permit conditional enrolment.
- Training: establish standards to be achieved for qualification levels, and hold local Commanders responsible for administering them. Permit civil equivalency to be accepted in place of DND courses where possible. Allow more training at unit level and support it with training aids and equipment (including computer-based training). Where centralized training is essential, it should be scheduled in alignment with Reservists availability; courses once set must not be cancelled.
- Administration: relieve the excess administrative paper burden on local units and their commanding officers.
- Pay: remove remaining irritants in the pay process.

MOBILIZATION, HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AND FOOTPRINT IN THE COMMUNITY

The place of Militia units in their local communities must not be discounted as an anachronism or 'surplus' force structure. As the Regular Army becomes more concentrated in fewer bases distant from Canada's population base, the often-touted "footprint in the community" role of the Reserves must be maintained as no less than a core activity of the CF. Indeed, community based presence of the military is more important now than at any time since the Second World War. Decisions made affecting that presence must not compromise the balance between short-term operational requirements and the longer-term public policy interests.

It is also critical that a sound formula for restructure be in place to minimize the impact on local communities of infrastructure decisions. We have been frustrated by the perceived tension between augmentation and mobilization held by people on both extremes of the debate on the Militia's 'true' role. Meeting both the current operational requirements of the CF, and maintaining a framework to expand if necessary, are not mutually exclusive prospects. Force structures need not be tied merely to Stage 3 or 4 mobilization in order to meet that framework. Temporary amalgamations, or 'tactical groupings', of units which have a role in Stage 4 can serve to keep alive the proud heritage of those units within their communities, while contributing to the financial benefit to be gained by streamlined command structures (i.e., reduced overhead). The role of these units in Stages 3 and 4 should be laid out in a mobilization plan, which has been described to us as a "promissory note" that the Department and the CF can have ready to present to the Government if necessary. This should be considered normal military activity - not intended by the SCRR Commissioners to be the long-term agonizing process that some cite as a reason not to do it. It is time to stop the debate about whether planning for Stages 3 and 4 mobilization is Government policy. As the Monitoring Committee has pointed out:

The 1994 Defence White Paper outlined a new, four-stage framework for mobilization planning. The structure provides for "a graduated and orderly transition from routine peacetime operations to higher levels of involvement, which ultimately could include the total mobilization of the nation." The four stages are as follows: force generation, force enhancement, force expansion and national mobilization.

The Minister directed the Department of National Defence to draft and implement a national mobilization plan "with all dispatch." The Minister also decided that the definition of stages three and four in the four phase mobilization scheme set out in the 1994 White Paper should be amended immediately to reflect clearly defined roles for the Reserve Force, and especially the Militia, as the basis for recruitment, training and the provision of formed units required in the event of a major conflict.

Unless the Government intends to state otherwise, more work on what would be required for the CF to move on to the advanced stages of mobilization would satisfy critics who expect the military to be paying some attention to the requirements of mobilization. It would also provide a template for the locations in Canada where Militia units should be located, as a basis for mobilization.

Restructuring decisions have to be made to bring Militia personnel strength to 18,500 to 20,500 (serving reservists as opposed to paid ceiling). Furthermore, change to the structure of the Militia, such as re-rolling, amalgamation or retirement of units to the Supplementary Order of Battle, must be done in such a way as to ensure the following:

- No reduction in the number of soldiers locally;
- Increased number of soldiers overall, within the mandated 18,500-20,500 strength for the Militia;

- Consideration of associated roles, such as regimental associations, cadets, community service or involvement and local emergency-related activity.

Recommendation #2: Acknowledge the legitimacy of Stages 3 and 4 mobilization as a part of the planning process, and the need for the Reserves structure to be able to support it. Prepare a national mobilization plan as the basis for restructuring. This is consistent with the 1994 *White Paper* and SCRR, and would assure reservists they have a role beyond augmentation for current operations.

Recommendation #3: Outline proposed roles for the reserves in general terms, including some introduction of non-traditional roles. Explain in common-sense terms why these changes are necessary under present and foreseeable conditions. Give assurance that most combat units will be retained even if some changes may be needed to ensure they are of viable size (e.g., "tactical groupings" of some units while retaining their traditional insignia).

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

The VCDS, in his force structure guidance, *Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century*, paints the picture of a reserve force that can constantly and continuously augment and reinforce up to 20% of CF operations. We have encountered a great deal of doubt among serving reservists that this goal can be met under current conditions of service. Without job protection legislation, in place in the United States, or enhanced Reserve Force incentives and legislative support, in place in the United Kingdom, the temporary, voluntary and informal system for reserve support that exists in Canada will probably not support the aims of the force structure guidance. The principle of voluntarism is paramount in the history of Canadian citizen soldiery, and strategic direction must be borne of that fact.

Recommendation #4: Acknowledge that NDHQ (i.e., the Regular Force) understands the different nature of reserve service (part-time, voluntary, limited commitment) and will design roles, standards and training regimes that take it into account. Consider new terms of engagement for reservists that may be needed to attract persons with developed skills in the civilian economy (e.g., civilian-military co-operation, psychological operations, vehicle maintenance). For this reason, we urge serious and urgent study of alternative terms of service, including those that may require legislative amendment. Revisit those SCRR recommendations which were initially rejected by the Department, such as contractual obligations and job protection legislation.

TRUST AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Many attempts to "fix" the Reserves over the past few decades have failed. The missing ingredient that can bring forth successful restructure is a permanent accountability framework in place to guide future decisions made that affect the Reserves. Also, we have been struck by the jaundiced attitude evident among serving Reservists toward promises made by NDHQ to revitalize the armoury floor. Commitment to the process by the so-called "armoury floor" is

critical to your objective of leading the Reserves into the 21st century. The suspicion built-up by years of broken promises and unrealized expectations can, however, be subdued by a high-profile, up front, 'agent of change' internal to the Department and the CF.

Chain of command for the Militia should remain integrated with the Regular Army and incorporate Militia officers. However, the responsibility for sustaining personnel levels, recruiting, training, administration, equipment and necessary resources falls under the CLS, who is directly accountable to the CDS who, in turn, is responsible and accountable to the Minister, for the state of the Militia. Therefore, we propose the following:

Recommendation #5: Provide reliable guarantees that the funding and equipment will be forthcoming on a continuing basis to support the new structure, including both "traditional" and "non-traditional" roles. It is important there be no "tricks" in this commitment, which is bound to be scrutinized very closely.

Recommendation #6: Bring the strength of the Reserves up to the 30,000 level (18,500-20,500 for the Army Reserves) as established in Government policy. Measures taken by implementing the above recommendations should achieve the results-oriented command and control required to attract and retain sufficient numbers of people.

Recommendation #7: A level One position should be established in the Department and the CF to act as a leader of change in carrying out the above recommendations, to keep the Minister and the CDS advised on progress, and generally to represent the needs, concerns and interests of the Reserves at the highest levels in the Department and the CF.

Recommendation #8: The Chief of the Defence Staff should include a separate section on the Reserves in his annual report on the State of the CF.

CONSULTATION AND MONITORING

Consultation outside the chain of command will ensure that the LFRR process remains transparent and open to scrutiny of interested parties. The hybrid political-military nature of the Reserves dictates that care be taken to define the 'reserve community' in as balanced a manner as possible. Command Consultative Working Groups, which consisted of the CLS as Chair, the Assistant CLS, the Reserve Advisor to the CLS (now the DG Land Reserves), two representatives of the Council of Honourary Colonels, two representatives of *Reserves 2000* and the Assistant Reserves Advisor as Secretary. As the then Minister of National Defence pointed out to SCONDVA in May 1996:

The specific roles and tasks of the reserves will be clearly defined in command level mobilization plans, and naturally the reserve community again will be involved in setting out these roles. Indeed, their suggestions have already been noted. I'd like to make particular mention of a group called Reserves 2000, which has done a remarkable job in pulling together the reserve community across the

country. In discussions with me it has certainly been very helpful in arriving at some of the conclusions we are outlining today.

Recommendation #9: Promise consultation with currently serving reserve authorities, including brigade and unit leadership, and other representatives of the broader reserve community, on how to implement these changes, and commit to a phased, prudent process of implementation that will include careful assessment of results and changes to the program as necessary. This should be achieved by simply resurrecting the Command and Area Consultative Working Groups with the same membership. These seemed to work well until the proposal of April 1999 disturbed the trust that had begun to build between NDHQ and the Reserves community.

Recommendation #10: Monitoring of the implementation of Ministerial decisions arising both out of the SCRR and this report should continue.

These accountability measures could go long way in restoring the trust of the Reserve community in the ability of NDHQ to deal with Reserve matters. A signal that Reserve issues are being dealt with at the top of the CF and DND hierarchy could also alleviate suspicion of new roles that may be given to the Militia. If such action is not taken soon to remedy problems that already inhibit the success of Reserve units, the process could very well be doomed.

If these recommendations are accepted, and stated as Government policy, much of the uncertainty surrounding the respective boundaries of Government and military authority should end. Furthermore, by providing the Militia with a road map to the 21st century, the Defence Establishment can be assured that the Reserves will continue to be available for traditional and non-traditional roles, and the broader reserves community can be assured that its voice will be heard in decisions which will affect one of Canada's most significant national institutions. These recommendations can, therefore, provide a framework for the strategic direction you want to take the Reserves that can accommodate the too often contentious link between public policy and departmental responsibility. The revitalization of Canada's citizen soldiers must be accepted and actively promoted as an urgent matter of public policy. Canadians should, therefore, be engaged in this process by the Minister, CF leadership and the Reserves community.

ANNEX A - Terms of Reference

Minister
of National Defence



Ministre
de la Défense nationale

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0K2

NOV 17 1999

Mr. John A. Fraser
Chairman
National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change
222 Queen Street, Suite 701
Ottawa ON K1A 0K2

Dear Mr. Fraser:

Thank you for your letter of October 25, 1999, concerning the roles of the reconstituted Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change.

I would like to confirm our mutual understanding of how these separate roles will be addressed:

- A reconstituted Monitoring Committee, consisting of Messrs. Daniel B. Dewar, David Bercuson and you, will continue to monitor the implementation of reforms primarily in the areas of leadership and the Reserves, providing me with a final report in the fall of 2000; and
- As Chair of the reconstituted Monitoring Committee, you will personally arrange to have the Committee review the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) process and provide me with advice on this matter. I understand that you will report your advice to me in late spring 2000. Furthermore, in order to fulfil your duties in this regard, you will consult with Major-General Stuart McDonald, Lieutenant-General Ray Crabbe (retired), Major-General Frederick Marriage (retired), and others as appropriate.


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As discussed in our telephone conversation of October 21, 1999, the existing Monitoring Committee's Secretariat will continue to assist you and the Monitoring Committee with both functions.

I appreciate the quality of work that has been produced so far by the Monitoring Committee and look forward to your advice and reports in the year 2000.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Arthur C. Eggleton', with a large, stylized initial 'A' and a long, sweeping horizontal stroke at the end.

Arthur C. Eggleton

ANNEX B - List of Abbreviations

AIRCOM	Air Command
AOR	Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment
AVGP	Armoured Vehicle General Purpose
CATGME	Canadian Air Task Group - Middle East
CCUNME	Canadian Contingent United Nations Middle East
CCWG	Command Consultative Working Group
CER	Combat Engineer Regiment
CF	Canadian Forces
CFB	Canadian Forces Base
CLS	Chief of the Land Staff
CMB	Canadian Mechanized Brigade
CMBG	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
CND	Committee for Nuclear Disarmament
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DND	Department of National Defence
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
EW	Early Warning
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FALLEX	NATO Exercise
FFH	Helicopter-carrying Frigate
FMC	Force Mobile Command
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
GBC	<i>Groupe-brigade du Canada</i>
HMCS	Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
HQ	Headquarters
IFOR	Implementation Force
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
LdSH	Lord Strathcona's Horse

LFC	Land Force Command
LFCA	Land Force Central Area
LFRR	Land Force Reserve Restructure
LFWA	Land Force Western Area
MAJAID	Major Air Disaster
MCDV	Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel
MCF	Main Contingency Force
MCM	Mines Countermeasures
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MND	Minister of National Defence
MMC	Minister's Monitoring Committee
MOS	Military Occupational Structure
MP	Military Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCE	National Command Element
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSE	National Support Element
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OGD	Other Government Department
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Light Infantry
R22^eR	Royal 22 nd Regiment
RALC	<i>Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada</i>
RBC	<i>Régiment blindé du Canada</i>
RCA	Royal Canadian Artillery
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCD	Royal Canadian Dragoons
RCR	Royal Canadian Regiment
RGC	<i>Régiment de génie de combat</i>
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SCONDVA	Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
SCRR	Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves

SQ	<i>Sécurité du Québec</i>
SSK	Conventional Submarine
SWG	Structural Working Group
THS	Tactical Helicopter Squadron
UN	United Nations
UNEF II	United Nations Emergency Force II
UNFICYP	United Nations Forces in Cyprus
UNMO	United Nations Military Officer
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group India Pakistan
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

ANNEX C - Biographies

The Honourable John A. Fraser Chairman

John Allen Fraser, P.C., O.C., O.B.C., C.D., Q.C., was born December 15, 1931, in Japan and raised and educated in British Columbia. He was called to the Bar in 1954 and practiced law until his election to the House of Commons in 1972. He was re-elected in 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1988. In opposition he served as critic on Environment, Labour, Post Office, Solicitor General and Fisheries matters. He was Minister of Environment and Postmaster General (1979-80), and then Minister of Fisheries (1984-85).

In 1986, Mr. Fraser became the first Speaker of the House of Commons to be elected by secret ballot by members of parliament. He served as Speaker until February 1994. His accomplishments as Speaker include the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Parliamentary Cooperation Program; the creation of the House of Commons Public Information Office; and the establishment of the House of Commons environmental program, Greening the Hill. In 1986, he established a House of Commons Task Force on the Disabled and Handicapped to ensure access and employment opportunities on Parliament Hill for the disadvantaged. He also commissioned the recent publication, *The House of Commons at Work*.

Over the years, Mr. Fraser has had a continuing interest in resource matters including fisheries and forestry and has demonstrated a profound commitment to environmental causes both as a lawyer and a parliamentarian. He has received a variety of national awards for his valuable contributions and tireless efforts in the area of sustainable development. In addition to these many awards, he has been active with a number of boards and foundations, and was awarded an honorary professorship from the Beijing Medical University (China) in 1992.

In 1994, Mr. Fraser was appointed Canada's Ambassador for the Environment, a position held until September, 1998. In 1995, in recognition of his many contributions to Canada, he was awarded the Order of Canada. He is also a member of the Order of British Columbia and holds the Canadian Forces Decoration. He continues to be active in environmental protection and resource conservation and was appointed Chair of the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council in September 1998.

Mr. Fraser has been associated with the Canadian Forces since 1950, when he first enlisted as a private soldier with the West Coast Signal Regiment. After two years with Canadian Officer Training Corps, he was commissioned as an infantry officer and posted to Germany in 1953 with the First Canadian Highland Battalion of the 27th Brigade. From 1954 to 1962, he served as an officer in both the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment. Mr. Fraser was appointed Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, in 1994 and is currently the Regiment's Honorary Colonel.

In October 1997, Mr. Fraser was appointed a member of the National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. He is currently Chair.

David Bercuson, Ph.D.

Member

David Bercuson was born in Montreal in August 1945. He attended Sir George Williams University, graduating in June 1966 with Honours in History and winning the Lieutenant-Governor's Silver Medal for the highest standing in history. Bercuson pursued graduate studies at the University of Toronto, earning an MA in history in 1967 and a Ph.D. in 1971.

Dr. Bercuson has published widely in academic and popular publications on a wide range of topics. He specializes in modern Canadian politics, Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canadian military history. He has written, coauthored, or edited over 25 popular and academic books and does political commentary for CBC and CTV television. He has written regular columns for the *Globe & Mail*, the *Financial Post* and other newspapers.

In 1988 Bercuson was elected to the Royal Society of Canada and in May, 1989, he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies at The University of Calgary. Since January 1997 he has been Director of the Strategic Studies Program at the University of Calgary. His book, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, won the Wilfred Eggleston Award for nonfiction at the Alberta Book Awards in May 1997. Another recent book, *Deadly Seas: The Story of the St. Croix, U305 and the Battle of the Atlantic*, coauthored with Dr. Holger Herwig, was on the *Maclean's* Bestseller list for several weeks. His most recent book *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* was published in September, 1999.

Dr. Bercuson was appointed Special Advisor to the Minister of National Defence on the Future of the Canadian Forces from January to April 1997.

D. Bevis Dewar

Member

Bevis Dewar was born in Kenmore, Ontario in August 1932. He studied at Queen's University where he obtained an Honours Bachelor of Arts degree in history, economics and political science in 1953, following which he pursued postgraduate studies in Canadian history also at Queen's.

In 1954, he joined the Public Service of Canada and was appointed to the Cabinet Secretariat in the Privy Council Office where he was secretary to Cabinet committees dealing with matters of interdepartmental liaison and policy development, mainly regarding external affairs and defence.

In 1963, he became a program analyst in the Treasury Board Secretariat. His duties consisted of program and expenditure budget analysis and of presenting recommendations dealing with defence production, industrial development, foreign affairs and defence. In 1968, he was named Assistant Secretary of the Program Branch at the Treasury Board Secretariat,

responsible for analyzing and making recommendations on expenditure budgets of all federal departments. The following year he became Deputy Secretary of the same Branch.

Mr. Dewar was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Medical Services Branch, Health and Welfare Canada in September 1973. From September, 1975 to August 1979, he served as Assistant Secretary for the Government Branch of Science and Technology Canada, responsible for the International Division, the Government Projects Division, and the Project Review and Assessment Division.

In August 1979, Mr. Dewar was appointed Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) in the Privy Council Office. He was responsible for secretariats on economic policy, government operations, foreign affairs and defence, native and social affairs, communications, emergency planning, labour relations, and legislation and House planning. From November 1982 to May 1989, Mr. Dewar served as Deputy Minister of National Defence. He was appointed Associate Secretary of the Cabinet and Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council in May 1989. In October, 1990, he was named Principal of the Canadian Centre for Management Development.

Mr. Dewar retired from public service in August 1992. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute on Governance and served as its Chairman from 1992 to 1997.

Sheila-Marie Cook **Executive Director**

Sheila-Marie Cook is an experienced strategic planner and communications consultant who has managed the operations of a number of Royal Commissions, Federal and Provincial Government Inquiries and Public Policy Reviews. Mrs. Cook holds degrees in History and Economics and has served as the Executive Director of the Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee on Change since April 1998.

Peter Archambault, Ph.D. **Director of Research**

Peter Archambault holds a B.A. and M.A. in History from the University of New Brunswick, and a Ph.D. in Military History, from the University of Calgary. His research areas include defence economics, civil-military relation and alliance politics since 1945. In addition to his work for the Monitoring Committee, Dr. Archambault is an Adjunct Associate Professor of War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Secretariat

Dennis Brook, Manager Informatics
Linda Cameron, Research Analyst
Manon Demers, Administrative Assistant
Isabelle Dumas, Research Analyst

